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choice theorists have argued that international law is simply an epiphenomenon of other state interests with little independent power at all. 5 Meanwhile, constructivist and transnational legal process approaches have posited that international law seeps into state behavior through psychological and sociological mechanisms of norm internalization and strategic action. 6 But even these studies tend to remain on a theoretical level, without on-the-ground data about which factors might influence compliance in actual day-to-day settings.
In recent years, international law scholarship has taken a more empirical turn. But this turn has been largely quantitative, relying on relatively blunt numerical measures that lack contextual richness or detailed analysis of the myriad possible causal factors that might explain compliance. 7 What is missing, even after all these years of debate, is a sustained commitment to qualitative analysis of the actual mechanisms by which compliance occurs. 8 Such qualitative studies are absolutely essential because they provide the nuance and contextual richness that might allow us to see how subtle factors influence these mechanisms of international law compliance. After all, even when we speak of domestic law, few would dispute that compliance occurs not so much because of fears of enforcement but because of combined 5 See, e.g., MICHAEL BYERS, CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 8 (1999) ("International relations scholars have traditionally . . . . regarded international law as something of an epiphenomenon, with rules of international law being dependent on power, subject to short-term alteration by power-applying States, and therefore of little relevance to how States actually behave."). 6 See, e.g., MARTHA FINNEMORE, NATIONAL INTERESTS IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 3 (1996) (asserting that states' interests "are shaped by internationally shared norms and values that structure and give meaning to international political life"); Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 204 (1996) ("As transnational actors interact, they create patterns of behavior and generate norms of external conduct which they in turn internalize."). 7 See, e. REV. 45 (2009) . In this article Scharf interviews the ten living former legal advisers of the U.S. Department of State to discuss the influence of international law on the formulation of foreign policy during times of crisis. Thus, Scharf's approach, like mine here, seeks on-the-ground empirical data to create a more nuanced understanding of how international law actually operates in shaping decisions and affecting policy.
international legal norms. This finding mirrors a recent empirical study performed by Michael P.
Scharf, in which he recounts, through interviews with ten former legal advisers of the Department of State, multiple instances during the past thirty years when, at the urging of the legal adviser, "U.S. policy-makers decided to forego the use of force or other policy preferences in order to comply with international law." 10 Scharf's study, like mine, suggests that we need to disaggregate abstract notions like "state interest" and look at how decisions are actually reached through the interaction of multiple actors. By doing so, it is much easier to see the constraining role played by international legal norms.
Just as importantly, my study suggests that JAG lawyers are most likely to function effectively and encourage legal compliance if certain organizational features are present. These findings track the organizational theory literature about what makes compliance officers within firms effective. Accordingly, the experience of JAG officers provides a useful case study for testing this broader theoretical literature and suggests links between organizational structure and legal compliance.
Part I of this article briefly introduces some basic insights gleaned from the literature on organizational culture regarding effective compliance agents, and looks at the institutional changes initiated by the U.S. military after the Vietnam War to foster a rule-of-law culture within the services. Part II then presents the results of my study of JAG lawyers operating in Iraq, focusing on the role that organizational structure has played in the effectiveness of these attorneys. What emerges from this analysis is a far more nuanced understanding of how compliance with international legal rules actually operates on the ground. From this perspective,
we can begin to see that fostering greater compliance may sometimes be less a matter of writing 10 Scharf, supra note 8, at 97.
new treaty provisions or increasing the activity of international courts and more a matter of subtly influencing organizational structures and cultural norms. Moreover, only by studying organizational culture can we hope to address a world where states alone do not serve as agents of international law compliance but where private corporations with radically varying institutional structures are also often engaged in human rights protection or violation. In this brave new world, international law compliance cannot be described through abstract models, and the sooner we move to a "thick" descriptive approach, 11 the better.
I. ORGANIZATIONAL THEORY AND MILITARY CULTURE
Organizational theory has not generally formed part of the study of international law
compliance. Yet, as I will attempt to show, this literature, particularly if further developed to focus on institutions applying international law norms, holds tremendous promise and could meaningfully reshape compliance debates. Of particular importance to our analysis here is how compliance agents within an organization-such as lawyers-can most effectively help ensure compliance with central rules and values of the firm, as well as various public norms.
Accordingly, I first turn to the findings of organizational theory on the elements that make for successful compliance agents.
The Importance of Organizational Structure and Institutional Culture
Organizational theorists have long recognized that group norms and internal organizational structures can further (or hinder) an organization's goals, as well as the goals of 11 See, e.g., Clifford Geertz, Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture, in THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES: SELECTED ESSAYS 3, 5-6 (1973).
As Edward Rubin has argued, organizational theorists can perhaps be divided into four camps: those who view organizations as a nexus of contracts, those who understand organizations as complex decision-making hierarchies, those who see organizations as influenced by broader societal forces or institutions, and those who describe organizations as complex systems or organisms. 16 For our purposes, these theories are important because, despite their differences, each would predict that the structure of an organization and its institutional culture will have distinct impacts on the efficacy of the organization and the likelihood that actors in it will conform to external norms of behavior. 12 See sources cited supra note 9. 13 See, e.g., Rubin, supra note 9. In law, organization theory is most associated with scholars who study the role of professionalization and professional organizations in the activity of lawyers. Douglass North and Oliver Williamson 19 -which views the organization more as a decisionmaking hierarchy. According to this approach, the organization amounts to much more than the sum of its parts: its formal governance structure and informal norms of behavior that cannot be captured in a contract count for just as much. Moreover, this group acknowledges that individuals may not always make rational decisions, and identifies many ways that the structure of a group or organization impedes individuals from making such decisions, contributing to "bounded" rationality.
From the perspective of decision theory, systems of "control, management, supervision,
[and] administration, in formal organizations" are critical. 20 Accordingly, leaders within the organization can define and seek to fulfill the organization's purposes by providing incentives and setting penalties for the organization's members. In addition, the location of a decision within the organization's hierarchy will affect its impact on the organization's members. 
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Employees may respond more readily to senior managers than to isolated corporate counsels; indeed, Sally Simpson has found that the idea of violating the law might have a positive appeal as an indication of aggressive business practice. 21 Nevertheless, as Rubin has noted, an internal compliance program that increases the size and authority of corporate counsel "will tend to increase the salience of the criminal law for operational employees" and their "uncertainty about the consequences of their actions may convince them that it is better to follow the instructions of the compliance personnel."
22
Other structural factors are also important. For example, Serge Taylor, in a study of environmental regulation, found that the ability of compliance personnel to monitor lower level personnel and then report back to higher level personnel within the firm increased compliance.
23
And as Rubin explains:
In the absence of a compliance program, an employee who decides to engage in legally risky behavior, like instituting a cheaper production process that creates more waste, may have nagging doubts about the wisdom of doing so, but will suppress some of those doubts in reporting to his superior, who will, in turn, suppress some of the doubts that were expressed to her in reporting to her superior. Compliance staff may short circuit some of these bureaucratic levels by reporting the employee's doubts directly to top management.
24 21 SALLY S. SIMPSON, CORPORATE CRIME, LAW, AND SOCIAL CONTROL 116-51 (2002). 22 Rubin, supra note 9, at 373. 23 TAYLOR, supra note 9. 24 Rubin, supra note 9, at 374.
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Accordingly, the existence of a compliance unit, combined with the ability of compliance employees to report misconduct up a chain of command independent of the operational employee management chain, may enhance compliance.
In addition to the formal organizational structures, informal institutional features can help build (or undermine) a culture of compliance. As Scott notes, citing the classic organizational theorist Chester Barnard, "informal organizations are necessary to the operation of formal organizations as a means of communication, of cohesion, and of protecting the integrity of the individual." 25 Moreover, Scott highlights the need for inducements of a "'personal, nonmaterialistic character,' including 'the opportunities for distinction, prestige, personal power, and 
an obituary notice, a memorial plaque) and the sources of disesteem they will not tolerate (South African investments, dirty washroom, no parking, insult from employers)." 29 The critical point, here, is that culture matters, that it varies across organizations, and that "[w]hat the individual is going to want is not entirely his own idea, but consists largely of a set of desires that the social environment inspires in him." 30 As we shall see, the U.S. military has adopted several organizational practices that, according to decision theory, should enhance commitment to the rule of law. With respect to formal structures, judge advocates have a strong role both in training troops and commanders, and in advising commanders in the field, which increase the salience of the law for operational employees. In addition, their ability to mete out criminal and administrative sanctions within the military justice system gives them strong authority. And judge advocates can report abuse through an independent chain of command, as in many of the successful compliance units that theorists have described. Finally, with respect to informal norms and culture, judge advocates construct narratives of commitment to rule-of-law values that contribute to their loyalty to those values.
More recently, a third group of scholars has turned its attention to how organizations respond to external forces, rather than just internal factors. Like the decision theorists who examine the informal norms within organizations, this group is also preoccupied with organizational culture. Yet economists and sociologists who define themselves as "institutionalists" take special interest in the ways the broader environment shapes that internal 29 Id. at 102. 30 Id.
culture. 31 As a consequence, they might see an organization as adopting a set of values or practices not merely because of their promotion internally, but also because of outside influence. 
literature also suggests that training regimens can have lasting effects on institutional culture by changing the normative space within the institution.
Finally, a fourth group of scholars-drawing on the work of Talcott Parsons, Niklas Luhmann, and others-has also focused on the impact of external forces on organizations, but through the lens of systems theory. 37 These scholars have argued that organizations such as corporations and bureaucracies are themselves systems as well as entities within larger systems. 
limits. There may be a deeply pervasive culture of real compliance with particular norms. Or the culture may be only one of paper compliance. The official culture may be committed to particular norms while an unofficial culture is much more complex. Or a culture of compliance may be found at the top of an organization and resistance at the bottom, or the reverse.
What is clear, however, is that organizational culture is one of the most compelling elements in determining which actors will behave in preferred ways and pursue jobs in accordance with preferred norms and values. Furthermore, from the organizational theory literature, we can begin to tease out those structural elements that will help ensure that compliance agents within an organization-such as lawyers-are actually effective at inculcating values and affecting the behavior of operational employees. These compliance agents are likely to be most effective, it appears, if (1) these agents are integrated with other, operational employees; (2) they have a strong understanding of, and sense of commitment to, the rules and values being enforced; (3) they are operating within an independent hierarchy; and (4) they can confer benefits or impose penalties on employees based on compliance.
39
Empirical research confirms the importance of these four organizational structures. For example, it turns out that the more company lawyers mingle with other corporate employees, the more likely all employees will be to begin to internalize the legal rules the lawyers seek to enforce. 40 As a result, the nonlawyer employees become more inclined to take those rules into account when they make decisions. 41 At the same time, lawyers who interact with other 39 See TAYLOR, supra note 9; Rubin, supra note 9. 40 See, e.g., SIMPSON, supra note 21. 41 
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employees learn to frame the rules better in terms of broader organizational goals, which in turn enhances the likelihood that operational employees will follow them. 42 Research on corporate lawyers also indicates that, if lawyers have a strong sense of obligation to report violationsstemming either from fealty to more senior lawyers within the organization or to a broader professional group and its norms and values-they will be more disposed to confront operational employees who are flouting the rules. 43 As to the need for an independent chain of command, the data suggest that accountability agents will enforce rules and norms more often if their own promotion, reputation, or advancement is to some degree independent of the operational employees. 44 Finally, and perhaps not surprisingly, if accountability agents can impose some form of sanction or confer a benefit on employees based on rule compliance, their ability to promote compliance increases. 45 Accordingly, we must consider the degree to which the organizational structures of the military track the four features described above, and thus contribute to a culture of compliance with public law values. And, if the organizational structure of the uniformed military does contribute to a culture of compliance, then we will need to take those organizational and institutional factors into account when understanding international law compliance more generally, both within the military and in other settings, public and private.
Organizational Structure and Institutional Culture in the U.S. Military
RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 125 (1992) ("An independent internal compliance group is essential to the success of an enforced self-regulation scheme."). 42 See 43 Id. 44 See TAYLOR, supra note 9. 45 See id.
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The U.S. military has a long tradition of at least formal respect for the rule of law and the limits that the law of war places on soldiers. As long ago as the U.S. Civil War, the U.S. Army educate troops from all services in the law of war. 55 The JAG Corps also gained new responsibilities on the battlefield: judge advocates were placed in the field to develop and review operations plans to ensure compliance with the law of war. 56 Each commander thus had the benefit of a lawyer's advice in the field, and military lawyers became involved in operational decision making as never before. Such actions helped institutionalize the authority and role of these lawyers in the military bureaucracy. In this way, the military as a whole deepened its 51 
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commitment to the law of war, and, just as significantly, put in place a group of lawyers with a clear mission to enforce adherence to that law.
As a result of these shifts, judge advocates now play a key role in training troops and commanders, before deployment or between deployments, specifically in the rules regarding the limits on the use of force. They also give continuing on-the-ground advice to troops and commanders on a range of legal matters, including the appropriate limits on the use of force. And they are more deeply engaged in investigating misconduct by troops and punishing them, either by imposing administrative penalties or by criminally prosecuting them in military courts.
The JAG training role is extensive. Before deployment, all troops receive training from JAG officers that includes sessions on the legal limits to the use of force. 57 These sessions may be tailored to the specific types of functions the troops will be performing 58 and include training in the specific rules of engagement for the particular operation.
59
In addition, judge advocates themselves receive extensive training. Beyond legal training at an accredited law school, all judge advocates must attend a course at one of the four JAG schools. 60 Indeed, after the Vietnam War and in response to experiences in Grenada, the military determined that judge advocates should receive training specifically in "the broad ranges of legal issues associated with the conduct of military operations." 61 The recognition that military 57 Interview with JAG Officer No. 14 (Oct. 18, 2007). I interviewed twenty judge advocates, most of whom had served in either Iraq or Afghanistan, or in both, during the previous five years and who had encountered private military contractors. I received permission from the Army JAG School in Virginia, and many of the interviews were conducted at the school in April 2007. Most of the interviewees had been in the JAG Corps for approximately eight years and were at the school for their second round of training. Several additional judge advocates were identified for interview through the so-called snowball method: they were mentioned by one or more of the initial interviewees. A few had served in other conflicts, including the first Persian Gulf war and the conflict in the Balkans in the 1990s. 58 Id. 
DRAFT-DO NOT CITE OR QUOTE REFER TO FINAL PUBLISHED VERSION: 104 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (2010).
lawyers needed to advise troops and commanders on the ground while deployed resulted in the development of "operational law," which is a "compendium of domestic, foreign, and international law applicable to U.S. forces engaged in combat or operations other than war." 62 After seven years of service, judge advocates are required to return to the school for another period of extensive training. 63 The school is staffed by experienced JAG officers who generally serve for terms of two years. 64 The JAG schools also produce legal handbooks, annually updated by the professors, which judge advocates carry with them into the field. 
Uphold Democracy in Haiti, soldiers "were confronted with a vignette in which a speeding vehicle crashed through a traffic check point barrier." A judge advocate "evaluated the soldiers' response and discussed alternative responses available within the limits set by the rules of engagement." 70 Judge advocates continue to hold these types of on-the-ground training sessions in Iraq. 71 As one senior military lawyer noted, the decisions made as to whether a particular use of force complies with the law of armed conflict or the rules of engagement are "highly situational" and require complex judgment honed by practical experience. PUBLISHED VERSION: 104 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (2010) . PUBLISHED VERSION: 104 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (2010) . t largely in secret to prepare the order, and excluded military lawyers (as well as lawyers from the State Department) from the process. Immediately after the release of the order, however, military lawyers strongly criticized the plan, specifically the denial of important procedural protections to defendants, including the lack of a right to choose a lawyer or requirement of a unanimous vote for death sentences. 75 These lawyers also expressed concern that, over time, the lack of protections in the proposed military commissions would undermine perceptions of the fairness of military justice more broadly, even though the U.C.M.J. includes strong protections for the rights of the accused.
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Partly in response to such criticisms, the Bush administration developed regulations that softened some of the most disputed provisions and required, for example, unanimity before the death penalty could be imposed, a presumption of innocence, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and a military appeals process. 77 Yet, as the commissions began their work, the military lawyers appointed to defend the accused continued to challenge the process, particularly because of the lack of judicial review in civilian courts. 78 PUBLISHED VERSION: 104 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (2010 3, 2003) ). 85 Id. (quoting Maj. Gen. Jack L. Rives). 86 Id.
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lawyers objected to Gen. Ricardo Sanchez's authorization of the controversial interrogation techniques in Iraq discussed previously. The lawyers argued that these techniques were ''overly aggressive,'' presumably because they would run afoul of the U.C.M.J. and international law. This Bush-era experience does suggest that organizational culture can play a crucial role either in weakening, or giving effect to, international law. To the extent that international law failed to constrain troops on the ground from committing abuses, it was at least in part because Bush administration political appointees took steps that effectively undermined a bureaucratic culture that had institutionalized respect for that law. Yet that culture-a military committed to the law of war and the fair treatment of detainees-also proved to be adhesive. 89 Organizational practices and values remained resilient, and served as the origin for much of the critique of, and resistance to, these changes. 
have a real impact, at least in the main. Further, the most effective organizational structure would be one designed to give these lawyers a deeply contextual role, helping design rules of engagement, providing situational training in theater, and advising commanders on a day-to-day basis. Yet institutional design, when translated into practice, can obviously fall short of its lofty aims. The next part therefore presents empirical data on the way this organizational structure plays out on the ground.
II. JUDGE ADVOCATES ON THE BATTLEFIELD
Uniformed military lawyers-the career judge advocates-are essentially the compliance unit within the military. These lawyers work to ensure that commanders and troops obey the rules of engagement, which are the rules that operationalize the law of armed conflict in a given war or occupation. The core public value undergirding this body of law is the principle that the use of force, even in an armed conflict, is limited. Specifically, troops may not target civilians, and the use of force must be proportional to the risk or danger present. Thus, military lawyers are essential to inculcating this public value into military culture.
Interviews with more than twenty uniformed military lawyers who served primarily in Iraq and Afghanistan indicate that the current military structure includes all four elements of a successful compliance unit that were discussed above. Judge advocates mingle with operational employees, the commanders and troops on the battlefield. They help devise the rules of engagement and train troops in those rules, both before they deploy and on the battlefield. At the same time, their ongoing advice to commanders and commanders' staff on the battlefield appears to make the legal rules they seek to enforce more salient throughout the organization. The lawyers report that they frame the rules in a way that describes them as supporting the broader
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goals of the organization: military effectiveness. These lawyers also profess a strong sense of commitment to the rules and the values that underlie them. And while the judge advocates face some challenges in establishing credibility, an independent chain of command-which obliges them to report incidents and serves as a basis for supplemental guidance in the field and as a basis for promotion that is separate from that of the operational employees-helps bolster the lawyers' independence and objectivity. Furthermore, uniformed lawyers play a key role in ensuring that commanders impose penalties on rule breakers within the military justice system. These include both administrative punishments such as loss in pay or rank, as well as more severe criminal penalties.
Of course, the accounts of JAG officers are likely to be self-serving and may therefore overstate the effectiveness of military lawyers. And, as noted above, an organizational structure, even if effective, can certainly be undermined through strategic maneuvering. Nevertheless, while having all of the organizational features in place does not necessarily guarantee norm compliance, there is evidence that the military lawyers do exert a very real impact on military operations, at least some of the time. As a result, we need to study the organizational structures that tend to increase norm compliance, even if that compliance remains imperfect. After all, no norm compliance regime is perfect, and an imperfect regime may still be significant, particularly when compared with even more imperfect alternatives.
Integration of Lawyers and Troops on the Battlefield and the Salience of Legal Rules
As discussed above, since Vietnam the military has vastly expanded the role of judge advocates in the field. Judge advocates now serve alongside commanders on the battlefield, giving advice on a range of issues from troop discipline to fiscal decision making, to vetting PUBLISHED VERSION: 104 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (2010) . The location and type of military assignment-Baghdad or Kirkuk, a detention facility or a city neighborhood-also affect the types of issues these lawyers face. For example, one lawyer, assigned to a brigade in Baghdad, said that his legal role was linked to the overall role of the brigade: "patrolling the battle space, controlling and pacifying it." 90 Accordingly, the lawyers were there "to bring the rule of law" to the area. " [We] At least in its ideal form, the operational/law relationship is one in which lawyers have the ear of the commander and the commander's staff for a range of operational decisions. As one judge advocate who served in Baghdad described it, "all targets are supposed to be cleared through us." 96 And, as he further noted, "it's a big job because you can't shoot at a lot of stuff in 
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Engagement] we were allowed to do it. [I determined that it was OK under the ROE of the time.] I helped the commander with the decision matrix.
99
This judge advocate further observed that "not all situations are rehearsed; you can't train for everything. That's why it was important that I was on the scene. You involve yourself in the fight."
100
Training troops and revising the rules of engagement. Training is an important part of the operational role. As one judge advocate noted, the pre-deployment training is "extensive."
101
Another observed that "we spend a lot of time training up our kids . . . . They get [the rules of engagement] beaten into their heads at the start," before they deploy.
102 "Then, they get more training in Kuwait," just before they enter the theater. 103 And when they are on the battlefield,
they receive yet more training in the appropriate limits on the use of force. Moreover, at each stage, the training goes beyond recitation of the rules and involves detailed discussion (and sometimes role playing) about specific scenarios likely to arise on the battlefield in question.
One judge advocate explained that it is also not mere training in the classroom: "We go through scenarios, we practice, and see what happens."
104
To be sure, the judge advocates acknowledged that training might not always prevent troops from crossing the line and using excessive force. As one interviewee conceded, "if a 99 Id. 
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sent a report tracker to division headquarters to alert "people at a higher level that we have a problem." According to the judge advocates, the integration of lawyers and troops also enhances the lawyers' credibility, because it demonstrates that they are participating in a common mission;
although they are lawyers, they are soldiers first and foremost. PUBLISHED VERSION: 104 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (2010) . inject yourself socially so you can be there professionally."
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Many judge advocates noted that combat experience before becoming a lawyer helped them to build trust with the commanders and their staffs once they assumed the role of lawyer.
For example, one judge advocate, a marine, argued that "it's easier in the marines" than in the other services because "every marine, whether serving in the infantry, in supply, or as a lawyer . .
. everyone goes to the same officer candidate school and has the same basic training: how to be an [infantry platoon commander]." 119 There is "a common culture, a common crucible of experience." 120 As a result, "yes, there is commander skepticism. But less than in the army." PUBLISHED VERSION: 104 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (2010) .
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Similarly, a judge advocate who had previously trained to become an officer in the armed forces said that because he had attended the Naval Academy and then West Point before he became a lawyer, he had "instant credibility."
123 "People remembered me," he said. 124 He further maintained that credibility by "doing [physical training], combatives, going to the range, and wrestling with the noncoms and staff." 125 "I stayed in shape," he continued. "I showed them that I didn't mind bloodying my nose . . . . It was clear that I was one of them." It is precisely this kind of mingling of accountability agents and operational employees that organizational theory credits with increasing the effectiveness of these agents. Thus, instead of being walled off from the rest of the organization, judge advocates speak with commanders and their staffs about the rules of engagement every day in the thick of battle, which increases general awareness of the importance of these rules, and together they engage in discussions about how best to interpret them. PUBLISHED VERSION: 104 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (2010) .
off, and we were going to respond, he wanted to know, 'Is it a good shoot or a bad shoot?' . . . Hopefully, they come to you. Hopefully they do it before they take action. 
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If there were three options on the table, and all were legal, I might say something like, "This option is close to the line, this one is safe, and this one is in the middle. As long as the option is legal, I'm there to ensure you accomplish the mission." 136 As a result, the judge advocates carefully translate their legal advice into operational terms, making it clear to commanders that the lawyers' job is not to say no but, rather, to help their commanders achieve the objectives of the mission. As one judge advocate put it, "You can't be Dr. No."
137 Even if a particular course of action posed legal problems, "our job was to
give an alternative course of action that would accomplish the goal without the legal PUBLISHED VERSION: 104 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (2010 
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commander's conscience . . . not like an inspector general but rather an internal conscience." The linchpin that holds us together at the end of the day is that the rule of law has to exist where citizens believe in equal protection, fairness, equity, justice. [We] make sure it exists within the military, and through leverage within our own organization to other countries we're trying to help, from demonstration. PUBLISHED VERSION: 104 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (2010 PUBLISHED VERSION: 104 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (2010 PUBLISHED VERSION: 104 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (2010 In addition to using the independent chain of command, some judge advocates report using the "CNN factor" to persuade commanders to follow their advice, meaning that a certain action "would look bad on CNN." 174 The possibility of congressional testimony is also a 
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When it comes to incidents involving the use of force, judge advocates described a strong sense of obligation to report them up the chain of command: PUBLISHED VERSION: 104 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (2010 
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even disclose those infractions to civilian criminal authorities. The closest analogy is to corporations or bureaucracies with an internal dispute resolution mechanism that can impose noncriminal penalties on employees who break the rules.
The judge advocates' ability to invoke the internal military justice system extends not merely to criminal acts, but also to acts in violation of military rules that, while not ordinarily rising to the level of a crime, would undermine military discipline. 185 Accordingly, in any given case a judge advocate can recommend that a commander initiate either a general court-martial procedure, which allows for the full range of penalties including jail time, or a more abbreviated
Article 15 proceeding, which permits only weaker administrative penalties. 186 The penalties arising from these proceedings can range from full-fledged criminal punishment to reductions in pay or rank, or dishonorable discharge. 187 The judge advocates are therefore central enforcers of military discipline.
Enforcement begins at the investigative stage. In cases where troops have allegedly misused force, the judge advocate will work together with the criminal investigative unit. Judge advocates, at least in the army, must report any incident in which a soldier fires a weapon. 188 The judge advocates reported that they often learned of cases from civilians, who would complain to the battalion in charge of the area when they or family members were injured in an incident involving the military. The judge advocate would then make an assessment based on the quality of the evidence as to whether to proceed: "We would move ahead when the claim sounded PUBLISHED VERSION: 104 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (2010) 
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Of course, it cannot be said for certain how effective these various organizational features-the mingling of lawyers and troops, an independent chain of command, the ability to impose criminal and administrative penalties-are in actually protecting public law values on the ground. As mentioned above, the perceptions of the judge advocates are bound to be somewhat self-serving. Nevertheless, the interviews do shed some light on this question. For example, one measure of whether judge advocates help protect public values (such as the rules limiting the use of force) is whether they can really guide commanders away-at least on occasion-from behavior that would undermine those values. While judge advocates take care not to describe their role as saying no to commanders, many were able to name cases in which they did persuade commanders not to follow a particular course for legal reasons. The judge advocates interviewed were by no means pollyannas about their role. On the contrary, they were acutely aware that the system breaks down, and that loyalty to a particular commander or unit sometimes trumps the lawyer's commitment to broader public values. Yet they see themselves as having an impact.
And despite their natural bias on this question, it does seem clear that, at least some of the time, having a strong, independent lawyer present matters.
As discussed above, uniformed lawyers were reluctant to describe their job as saying no to commanders and, instead, cast themselves as finding alternative means within the law to enable commanders to accomplish military objectives. 195 In this regard they are actually very much like most business counselors or transactional lawyers.
Judge advocates did, however, describe some instances in which they went further and actively intervened to try to stop commanders from taking a particular action. As one judge advocate reported, "[On occasion] I said, 'Sir, this is a bad idea, you should do this differently.' I 195 See text at notes 139-42 supra.
proceedings, and most of those received criminal or administrative penalties. 211 While the report criticizes the military for not punishing more soldiers, and for failing to punish high-ranking officers, the percentage of those punished is much higher than it is for, say, military contractors.
Indeed, of twenty contractors implicated in the cases documented in the report, only one faced criminal punishment.
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Uniformed judge advocates are also playing a broader role within the executive branch.
For example, they were a powerful force behind revising the Bush administration's detainee treatment rules to prohibit torture, and they strongly criticized the limited due process protections for terrorist suspects brought before military commissions. 213 Indeed, numerous judge advocates have resigned rather than take part in proceedings before military commissions. For example, two air force prosecutors, Maj. John Carr (a captain at the time) and Maj. Robert Preston, requested that they be reassigned rather than participate in the proceedings, having charged that fellow prosecutors were ignoring torture allegations, failing to protect exculpatory evidence, and withholding information from superiors. 214 More recently, Lt. Col. Darrel Vandeveld, a U.S.
military prosecutor at Guantánamo, quit because his office suppressed evidence that could have cleared a client. 215 The interviews recounted here suggest that, at the very least, having an independent Judge Advocate General's Corps embedded with troops has some constraining effect by injecting public values into volatile wartime contexts. PUBLISHED VERSION: 104 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (2010) .
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III. CONCLUSION
Even when all four of the organizational characteristics that tend to correlate with an effective compliance regime are in place, the mere existence of military lawyers does not guarantee that legal norms will be obeyed. Moreover, these lawyers are likely to overstate their own importance as agents of compliance. In any event, this is simply one case study.
Nevertheless, both the literature on organizational theory and the on-the-ground observations of military lawyers suggest that when we think about international law compliance, we cannot ignore organizational structure and institutional culture. Indeed, reforms aimed at structure and culture may well run deeper and last longer than other possible efforts to induce greater compliance. Consider, for example, reforms aimed at nonstate entities such as private security contractors. If we wish to render such entities more likely to abide by external legal norms, we may find that tackling internal organizational structure and institutional culture may be more effective than trying to impose additional rules. 216 Accordingly, instead of focusing exclusively on new treaties or new international judicial rulings that seek to inculcate norms formally, we might instead look to how best to alter organizational structure and institutional culture on the ground. 217 
